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Abstract
Fault tolerance is one of the most important means to avoid service failure in the presence of faults, so to
guarantee they will not interrupt the service delivery. Software testing, instead, is one of the major fault
removal techniques, realized in order to detect and remove software faults during software development so
that they will not be present in the ﬁnal product.
This paper shows how fault tolerance and testing can be used to validate component-based systems. Fault
tolerance requirements guide the construction of a fault-tolerant architecture, which is successively validated
with respect to requirements and submitted to testing. The theory is applied over a mining control system
running example.
Keywords: Fault tolerance, Component-based Software Systems, Software Architecture, Testing.
1 Introduction
When engineering complex and critical component-based software systems (CBS)
(think to aerospace, transportation, communication, energy and health-care sys-
tems), denial of services can have economics consequences and can also endanger
human life. Fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal and, fault forecasting
are the four main means developed over the course of the past ﬁfty years to attain
the various attributes of dependability [4]. Fault prevention and fault tolerance
aim to prevent the introduction of faults or to avoid service failures when faults oc-
cur. Fault removal and fault forecasting, instead, mean to reduce the number and
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severity of faults, and to estimate present and future incidence and consequences of
faults. As discussed in [10], fault prevention mechanisms can fail to prevent/remove
the occurrence of all faults, and fault tolerance is the most promising mechanism
for achieving dependability requirements.
Fault tolerance preserves the delivery of correct services in the presence of active
faults and is generally implemented by error detection and subsequent system re-
covery. Recently, several studies have evidenced the need of fault tolerance support
during the entire system life cycle [24,9], with especial interest at the architectural
level [5]. Some colleagues have proposed their solutions for fault tolerance via ex-
ception handling at the software architecture and component level (e.g. [24,17,8]).
However, fault tolerance techniques alone are not enough to achieve full guaran-
tee of fault tolerance requirements for critical CBS: unexpected faults or malicious
security attacks, in fact, cannot be always avoided nor tolerated [2]. Our proposal
suggests to complement fault tolerance with fault removal techniques in order to
reduce the number and severity of all such unexpected faults. Being software test-
ing one of the major fault removal techniques, we introduce a testing strategy to
evaluate, and thereby conﬁrm or improve, system dependability at run-time.
The main goal of this paper is to propose a comprehensive approach for de-
veloping and validating CBS systems according to fault tolerance requirements.
The approach starts with requirements analysis in order to identify critical services
(those to be maintained during faults or attacks). Fault tolerance decisions are
taken and a fault tolerant component-based software architecture (CBSA) model is
realized in order to achieve fault tolerance requirements.
According to the idealized fault-tolerant component model introduced in [19],
normal and exceptional behaviors of system components are speciﬁed. While nor-
mal responses are those situations where components provide normal services, ex-
ceptional responses correspond to errors detected into a component or the entire
architecture. Finally, test case speciﬁcations are extracted from the CBSA speci-
ﬁcation to validate the implementation adherence to fault tolerance requirements.
During normal execution, the testing approach validates the CBS compliance to
normal requirements, in accordance to the architectural speciﬁcation. During a
faulty execution, the testing approach veriﬁes if and how much the system complies
to fault tolerance requirements when failures arise.
Section 2 shows related work on the topic. Section 3 presents the main activities
for architecting fault tolerant component-based software systems, while details and
our proposal application to the mining control case study is illustrated in Section
4. Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines future work directions.
2 Related Work
Some colleagues have proposed their solutions to the problem of incorporating fault
tolerance during architectural design. Issarny and Banaˆtre in [17] and Castor Filho
et. al. in [11] share the idea of using the Software Architecture speciﬁcation as the
primary point where to deal with exception handling. In [17] the authors investi-
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gate the deﬁnition of exceptions at the architectural level. Their model takes into
consideration exception handling implemented within components and connectors,
and exception handling at the architectural (conﬁguration) level. In [11] the authors
propose an initial work on Aereal, a framework to extend architectural descriptions
with information about exceptions, deﬁning how exceptions ﬂow between architec-
tural elements. Other approaches (e.g., Rubira et. al. in [24] and Guelﬁ et. al. in
[12]), instead, incorporate exceptional behaviors during the entire development of
fault tolerant distributed systems.
Other approaches have analyzed how fault tolerant CBS can be submitted to
testing. The MDCE+ method, presented in [8], systematizes the identiﬁcation,
design, implementation, and testing of the exceptional activities in the software
development phases. Sinha and Harrold [25] propose an approach for testing the
exceptional activity of a system in a white box way. This works only cover unit
tests and requires the source code of the tested components to be available. M.
Elder in his Ph.D. Thesis [10] identiﬁes the relationships among fault tolerance
and dependability, but it does not provide any testing technique to conﬁrm the
implementation conformance to fault tolerance requirements.
Diﬀerently from related work, this paper describes how fault tolerance and test-
ing can jointly contribute to architect a dependable component-based system.
3 Architecting Fault-tolerant CBS: Overview
In our perspective, three main activities have to be carried out in order to architect
and validate a fault-tolerant system:
• In activity a1, requirements are elicited. Fault tolerance requirements are speci-
ﬁed in order to identify the adequate level of services in case of system damage.
Fault scenarios are selected (based on the assessment of risks and faults) to
evidence how the system should behave in case of faults. Use cases are speciﬁed
in order to highlight functional requirements, and extended in order to specify
critical services.
• In activity a2, identiﬁed requirements guide the selection of a suitable and fault-
tolerant software architecture. Diﬀerently from a traditional software architecture
model, this speciﬁcation has to provide a description of both how the CBSA
behaves in normal and in exceptional situations, and how faults can be tolerated.
Model-checking techniques can be employed to prove the CBSA conformance to
fault tolerance requirements.
• In activity a3 testing is utilized to validate the conformance of the system im-
plementation to fault tolerance requirements, through the fault-tolerant CBSA
speciﬁcation. Test speciﬁcations are extracted from the CBSA speciﬁcation and
then run over the CBS implementation to validate the requirements achievement.
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4 Architecting Fault-tolerant CBS: Details and Appli-
cation
In this section we detail the identiﬁed activities and apply them to a running ex-
ample, while taking model-based notations as speciﬁcation means.
The running example taken into consideration is the mining control system case
study [24], a simpliﬁed system for the mining environment which handles the mineral
extraction from a mine (which produces water and releases methane gas on the air).
The system is composed by three main sub-systems: Pump Control, Air Extractor
Control, and Mineral Extractor Control. In the following we explain and apply the
methodology to the Air Extractor Control sub-system, in order to better explain
the theoretical aspects detailed in the following.
4.1 Activity a1: Fault tolerance Requirements Identiﬁcation
We start with the identiﬁcation of two classes of requirements: primary and auxil-
iary. A primary requirement is the one that must be always satisﬁed, while auxiliary
requirements are requirements that can be set aside in degraded operating modes.
In the presence of faults, auxiliary requirements can be provided in a degraded way.
The next step of activity a1 is the Use Case diagram realization. From the
primary and auxiliary requirements we can deﬁne two kinds of Use Cases, N UCs
that are use cases used for describing normal functionalities and exc UCs used for
describing exceptional functionalities.
When normal and exceptional use cases are identiﬁed, the adequate means to
tolerate faults which could aﬀect critical services can be implemented. If faults
are detected early in the software process, the overall system robustness can be
improved, and fault tolerance responsibilities can be identiﬁed during the entire
software production process, and assigned at the right level of abstraction. Accord-
ing to the idealized component model [19,24], normal and exceptional behaviors
must be speciﬁed, and exceptional behaviors must be handled.
When an exception happens, the extending use case is executed in order to
handle it. For each extending use case, additional documentation is provided in
the form of Cockburn’s Use Case templates in order to explicitly deﬁne exceptional
conditions, symptoms and recovery measures. Exceptional functionalities may be
then realized to describe how and when faults can happen and how they interact
with the normal ﬂow of events.
4.1.1 Application of activity a1
After having identiﬁed the requirements of the system they are organized in pri-
maries and auxiliaries. The requirements of the Air Extractor Control subsystem
are:
REQ1: the component must be able to extract air from the mine;
REQ2: if the level of methane becomes high the pump that extracts the air have
to be switched on;
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REQ3: when the air extraction process is on, if the methane level becomes accept-
able then it has to be switched oﬀ;
REQ4: the air extraction process must be monitored.
REQ1, REQ2, and REQ4 requirements are considered primaries, while REQ3 is
an auxiliary requirement.
exc_SwitchAirExtractorOff
exc_SwitchAirExtractorOn exc_AirExtractorFailure
AirFlow
AirExtractor MethaneHigh
N_ExtractAir
MethaneLow
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
Fig. 1. Use Case Diagram for Air Extractor Control sub-system
The next step of activity a1 is the Use Case diagram realization. From the
auxiliary and primary requirements we can deﬁne two kinds of Use Cases: N UCs
that are use cases used for describing normal functionalities and exc UC used for
describing exceptional functionalities. Figure 1 shows the use case diagram for the
case study. In particular the N ExtractAir use case describes the sequence of actions
for the air extraction inside the mine, and the AirFlow, AirExtractor, MethaneHigh,
and MethaneFlow actors are involved in this functionality.
4.2 Activity a2: Fault-Tolerant Architecture Speciﬁcation
Software Architecture has been largely accepted as a well suited tool to achieve a
better software quality while reducing the time and cost of production. In partic-
ular, a software architecture speciﬁcation represents the ﬁrst, in the development
life-cycle, complete system description. It provides both a high-level behavioral ab-
straction of components and of their interactions (connectors) and, a description of
the static structure of the system.
Typical SA speciﬁcations model only normal behaviors of the system, while ig-
noring exceptional ones. As a consequence, the system may fail in unexpected ways
due to some faults. In the context of critical systems fault tolerance requirements
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Fig. 2. Ideal Component
it becomes necessary to introduce fault tolerance information at the software archi-
tecture level. Following the idealized fault tolerant component model [19,24], when
dealing with fault tolerance at the software architecture level, an ideal component
implements two diﬀerent parts: normal and exceptional activities (see Figure 2).
The normal part implements the component’s normal services and the exceptional
part implements the responses of the component to exceptional situations, by means
of exception-handling techniques. When the normal behavior of a component raises
an exception, called local exception, its exception handling part is automatically
invoked. If the exception is successfully handled the component resumes its nor-
mal behavior, otherwise an external exception is signalled. External exceptions are
signalled to the enclosing context when the component realizes that is not able to
provide the service. There are two diﬀerent external exceptions: failure exceptions
due to a failure in processing a valid request and interface exceptions due to an
invalid service request.
According to the idealized fault tolerant component model, the modeling lan-
guage that we propose encompasses both a structural and a behavioral speciﬁcation
of a fault-tolerant architecture. The structural part describes how components and
connectors are composed of a normal and an exceptional part, and relationships
among them. The behavioral part, instead, speciﬁes how components and con-
nectors are intended to interact, according to the rules imposed by the idealized
component model.
As modeling tool we make use of UML2.0. In fact, even though in the last
years, the SA community has observed a proliferation of Architecture Description
Languages (ADLs) for rigorous and formal SA modeling and analysis [21], industries
still tend to prefer model-based (semi-formal) notations. In particular, with the
introduction of UML as the de-facto standard to model software systems and its
widespread adoption in industrial contexts, many extensions and proﬁles have been
proposed to “adapt” UML to model architectures (e.g., [20,16]).
Focusing on the structural part, we make use of UML2.0 component diagrams,
deﬁning a proﬁle for fault tolerance (Figure 3 shows a stereotyped component di-
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<<Normal Component>>
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I_AirExtractorFailure
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E_SwitchAirExtractorOn
E_SwitchAirExtractorOff E_AirExtractoFailure
I_SwitchAirExtractorOff
<<SA Component>>
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Operator Interface
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I_SwitchAirExtractorOn
{HasException=false}
{HasException=false} {HasException=false} 
{HasException=false}
{HasException=true}
<<IC Port>><<IC Port>><<IC Port>>
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<<Raiser Interface>>
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<<Handler Interface>>
<<Handler Interface>>
<<Raiser Interface>> <<Handler Interface>>
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<<Raiser Interface>>
{HasException=false}
{HasException=false}
{IsCritical=true}
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<<SA Component>>
Air ExtractorOn
<<SA Component>>
Air ExtractorOff
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Air ExtractorFailure
{IsCritical=false}
{IsCritical=false}
<<SA Component>>
Pump Control
<<SA Component>>
Mineral Extractor
Control
{IsCritical=false}
{IsCritical=false} {IsCritical=false}
Fig. 3. Air Extractor Control component with fault tolerance information
agram built according to the proﬁle). According to our proﬁle, an SA component
is a stereotyped UML component (SAComponent). The SA component contains
the boolean tag HasException that is true if the component has a description of
the fault-tolerant behavior, false otherwise. SA Component is even specialized with
the stereotypesNormalComponent andExceptionalComponent describing the normal
and the exceptional behavior, respectively. Components can have ports to manage
the communication with other components and connectors. Ports are also used in
order to model communication ports for signalled exceptions. Then we have normal
ports and ports specialized by the stereotype ICPorts for modeling exceptions
communication. Finally UML component interfaces are used for the exceptions
propagation from the normal to the exceptional part specialized with the stereo-
types HandlerInterface and RaiserInterface representing the handler and the raiser
respectively.
Since we are interested in the dependability of systems we introduce also the
boolean tag IsCritical that is true if the component is “critical”. A component is
critical if it implements at least one “critical service”.
On the behavioral side, we describe the behavior of the components and the
connectors by means of UML state diagrams. This model is in fact intuitive and
it represents an easy way to describe the behavior of a single component. Excep-
tional behaviors must take into account both exceptions signalling and exceptions
managing, showing the recovery measures to bring the system back to an error-free
state. In case of a component is not able to manage, the exception the behavior
must show how the exception is forwarded to the enclosing context.
An extension to the UML 2.0 state diagrams notation is needed, in order to
explicitly model how components can communicate. Labels on transitions uniquely
identify the architectural communication channels. Operations allowed for commu-
nication are send and receive, denoted by an exclamation mark “!” and a question
mark “?”, respectively. For each component with an exceptional part, we have two
state machines describing the normal and the exceptional behavior. The states of
the state machines that are the target of at least one exiting transition representing
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a signalled exception (exception signalled from the normal part to the exceptional
one) are called exceptional states and are denoted with the “exc ” preﬁx. An exam-
ple of a normal and exceptional state machine associated to a normal/exceptional
component can be found in Figures 4.
When the SA is modeled, it can be veriﬁed with respect to its requirements.
We already developed a tool for verifying SAs, called Charmy, and the idea is to
extend Charmy for verifying fault tolerant SAs.
Charmy [1,15] is a framework that aims at assisting the software architect in
designing Software Architectures and in validating them against functional require-
ments. State machines and scenarios are the source notations for specifying Software
Architectures and their behavioral properties. Model checking techniques are used
to check the consistency between the software architecture and the functional re-
quirements. The model checker SPIN [14] is the veriﬁcation engine in Charmy; a
Promela speciﬁcation and Bu¨chi Automata [7], modelling the software architecture
and the requirements respectively, are both derived from the source notations. SPIN
takes in input such speciﬁcations and performs model checking. A software process
is associated to the framework to help identifying and reﬁning architectural models.
Finally, Charmy is tool supported. It oﬀers a graphical user interface which helps
to specify the software architecture and automates the approach.
Following the Charmy idea, fault tolerant scenarios identiﬁed during activity a1
are expressed in terms of architecture-level Properties Sequence Charts (PSC) [23,3],
(an extension of a subset of UML2.0 sequence diagrams used to specify properties),
and automatically translated into Bu¨chi automata. The architectural behavioral
and structural models contribute to the generation of a Promela prototype. The
SPIN model-checker is used to validate the Promela code (architectural speciﬁca-
tion) conformance to Bu¨chi automata (requirements). The main diﬀerences when
adapting the current model-checking technique to fault-tolerant architectures, are
listed below:
• Bu¨chi automata generation: even if requirements validated by the Charmy tool
do not include fault tolerant scenarios we can use the same speciﬁcation language
used in Charmy;
• Promela code generation: since the fault-tolerant architectural speciﬁcation intro-
duces some concepts not present in Charmy, we have to change the translation
algorithm;
• Validation process with SPIN : we expect to use exactly the same veriﬁcation and
validation SPIN capabilities utilized in Charmy.
4.2.1 Application of activity a2
Figure 3 shows the SA for the mining control system. Two are the main components:
the Operator Interface component, which represents the operator user interface, and
the Control Station, which is divided into three subcomponents: Pump Control, Air
Extractor Control, and Mineral Extractor Control. Pump Control is responsible of
monitoring the water level, Air Extractor Control controls the methane level, and
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ﬁnally the mineral extraction is monitored by the Mineral Extractor Control.
Fig. 4. AirExtractorControl component behavior
Figure 4 shows the normal behavior of the AirExtractorControl component while
Figure 5 represents the exceptional behavior of the same component. The nor-
mal behavior of this component is associated with the extraction of air from the
mine. When the methane levels are high (MethaneHigh==on) the AirExtractor is
switched on (!switchOn) and when they drop to acceptable levels the AirExtractor
is switched oﬀ (!switchOﬀ ). We can have some Exceptional behaviors; for example
when no ﬂow of air is detected (Airﬂow==oﬀ ) the AirExtractor is switched on. This
situation is identiﬁed as a failure in the AirExtractor. The handling of this excep-
tion is to raise an exception (!I exc AirExtractorFailure), to manage the exception
(!Man exc AirExtractor- Failure EA), through the ExceptionalAirExtractorControl
Component, and to switch oﬀ the AirExtractor (!switchOﬀ ).
Fig. 5. ExceptionalAirExtractorControl component behavior
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4.3 Activity a3: Fault tolerance Testing
According to [13], a model-based test generator accepts as main inputs a model of
the software under test, and a set of test generation directives which guide the test
cases selection. It outputs a test speciﬁcation, which includes a set of stimuli the
tester should introduce in the system together with expected responses.
When dealing with model-based testing of software architectures, the model of
the software under test is the architectural model itself (which acts as an oracle),
while the test generation directives can be architecture-level sequence diagrams,
describing classes of interest for testing purposes.
As in model-based testing, when dealing with testing based on architectural
speciﬁcation of fault-tolerant architectures, two main activities are required: test
selection (architecture-level test cases are selected from the SA speciﬁcation for fault
tolerance testing purposes) and test execution (test cases are run on the system
implementation).
• Activity a3.1: Test Selection
When moving from the speciﬁcation to the implementation of a fault-tolerant
system, we would like to test if the system implementation conforms to the se-
lected architecture. For this purpose, we have to go through a test selection
phase.
Test selection at the architecture level consists in the identiﬁcation of suitable
abstract test cases to be run on the system implementation [22]. Suitability
is given by the test case contribution to discover as many failures as possible,
according to a test criterion [6]. The fault-tolerant software architecture itself
represents the test oracle to which the real execution needs to be compliant. The
abstract test cases can be detailed to produce executable test cases.
In our context the test criterion consists in identifying all those test cases which
cover faulty situations. Then, we want to test if the system implementation
behaves accordingly to the fault tolerance requirements, when faults happen, as
implemented in the fault-tolerant software architecture speciﬁcation.
As in more traditional speciﬁcation-based testing approaches, a test case is
seen as a path covering the behavioral graph produced out of the state machine-
based speciﬁcation (e.g., [18]). It is produced by appropriately covering the state
machine model of the system. In order to identify architecture-level test cases,
we start from the structural and behavioral SA speciﬁcation: from the structural
model we retain information on which service is considered critical, and on which
critical or exceptional component implements such a service. From the behavioral
model of critical and exceptional components, we retain information on how the
system implementation is supposed to work at run-time.
Test cases are selected accordingly to the following pseudo-algorithm:
(i) Selection of initial exceptional states (IES): given the components state ma-
chines, states labeled with the “exc ” preﬁx are selected. Such states represent
those states reached when an exception is signalled to the exceptional part. IES
represents the interface among the normal and exceptional system behavior, as
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already explained in Section 4.2;
Fig. 6. Architectural Test Cases for the AirExtractorControl Components
(ii) Architectural Test Case (ATC) selection: a test case is deﬁned as a path, cov-
ering the critical behaviors of the fault-tolerant SA. An ATC is obtained by
composing two diﬀerent parts: the NormalATC and the ExceptionalATC. A
NormalATC path starts from the initial state and reaches an IES state and an
ExceptionalATC starts from an IES state and reaches a normal state again.
Path coverage criteria can be applied (e.g., McCabe’s, all edges, all nodes).
However, we suggest to use a more extensive coverage criteria in order to im-
prove the testing eﬀectiveness. Indeed, every path selected by the algorithm
will comply to the idealized component model pattern [19,24] we are inspired
from.
Each ATC path provides two types of information: the exceptional event which
forces the system to enter an exceptional state and the expected behavior (the
scenario itself) which acts as an oracle.
• Activity a3.2: Test Execution
Test execution consists in forcing the system to raise the under-test exceptional
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situations, and evaluating how the system reacts according to the architecturally
specify expected behavior. The NormalATC provides information on which ex-
ception must be signalled, while ExceptionalATC provides information on which
behavior we planned our system implementation to realized, in accordance to the
fault tolerance requirements.
As in executing tests in traditional systems, two are the main sub-activities to
be performed: i) identify those “inputs” which force the execution of the selected
test case, ii) put the system in a state from which the speciﬁed test can be
launched [6].
Regarding the ﬁrst requirement, the architectural speciﬁcation and the test case
itself describes which are the operations that must be performed on the system
in order to reach an IES state (information contained in the NormalATC path).
Regarding the second requirement, inputs enabling the execution of the selected
ATC must be inserted into the system in order to enable its transition to the
desired state (information contained in the ExceptionalATC path).
4.3.1 Application of activity a3
When focussing on the AirExtractorControl (normal and exceptional) component
behavior, there is only one IES state: the exc Management (as shown in Figure 4).
As explained in Section 4.3, a path coverage over the interacting components
state machines generates architecture-level test cases (ATC). Assuming the path
coverage criteria intends “to select at least once all transitions which makes the
system move from a normal execution to an exceptional one”, the ATCs in Figure 6
are generated.
During test execution, the four exceptional events modeled in the four ATCs are
forced to happen in the system. If the system execution does not conform to what
expected from the architectural speciﬁcation, an architectural error is found.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we presented how testing and fault tolerance can be jointly used in order
to improve and validate CBS. In fact even if these two techniques are recognized
to be two major approaches in software dependability engineering, they have been
scarcely utilized together so far. The approach starts from the requirements analysis,
discriminating among primarily and auxiliary requirements, allows the identiﬁcation
and speciﬁcation of a fault tolerant SA, and eventually permits the generation of
test speciﬁcations.
On the future work side we plan to better investigate the proposed activities and
to improve the activity in which the fault-tolerant architecture adequacy to fault
tolerance is validated. Since the software architecture speciﬁcation represents the
ﬁrst step in the design of a CBS, this validation stage is required to guarantee the
eﬀectiveness of the successive stages. As we introduced in this paper, the main idea
is to specify fault tolerance requirements as properties the system should satisfy, and
to use a model-checking engine to validate if the fault tolerant architecture model
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satisﬁes such requirements. For this purpose, we plan to extend the Charmy tool
for the speciﬁcation and checking of fault tolerant software architectures. In this
setting it is particularly interesting to study the impact in terms of state space when
considering fault occurrences in any possible state of the system.
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